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Deposit Protection in the European 
Economic Communityt 
Laura Shea* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Community (EC) Proposed Directive on the Coor-
dination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relat-
ing to Deposit Guarantee Schemes l (Proposed Directive) was pub-
lished April 14, 1992. The final Directive on the subject should be 
published in 1993. Before commenting upon the Proposed Direc-
tive, it is useful to review the history of deposit protection and 
related EC banking Directives and proposals.2 This article will review 
the most important aspects of the United States and three Member 
State's depository protection schemes. In addition, this article will 
compare these four depository protection schemes with the EC 
Proposed Directive. 
Deposit protection schemes traditionally have been introduced as 
the result of some financial disaster. In the United States, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was established in 19333 due 
to bank failures in the Great Depression. Most of the EC Member 
States did not introduce deposit protection schemes until the late 
1970s or early 1980s. These deposit protection schemes were put in 
place, in part, as a reaction to bank failures in the individual or 
neighboring Member States. Also, in 1986, the Commission of the 
European Economic Community (Commission) made a non-bind-
ing recommendation that all Member States introduce deposit-guar-
t Copyright © 1993 Laura Shea. 
* The author would like to thank Advocat General of the European Court of Justice, Walter 
Van Gervan for his suggestions and counseling on this paper. Sources and materials for this 
article are on file with the author. 
1 Proposal for a Council Directive on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes, 1992 OJ. (C 163) 6 
[hereinafter Proposed Directive]. 
2 See id. at Annex II for a list of related EC banking Directives and proposals. 
3 See generally R. M. PECCHIOU, PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION IN BANKING (1987). 
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antee schemes in order to improve "the functioning of the Euro-
pean internal market."4 
Failure of credit institutions5 in the EC, which occurred before 
deposit protection systems were put in place, were fully covered. 
Thus, the full faith and credit of individual countries has de facto 
guaranteed private credit institutions established in their territory. 
This practice prevented failed credit institutions from contaminat-
ing healthy credit institutions and limited adverse economic reper-
cussions in their individual financial markets. 6 This practice is ex-
pensive for the national governments and their taxpayers, and now 
the responsibility for insuring credit institutions has shifted to the 
individual credit institutions and to depositors. Most depositors do 
not realize their position and they should be informed of it. 
II. THE SECOND BANKING DIRECTIVE AND RELATED DIRECTIVES 
The Second Banking Directive introduced the principles of a 
single banking license and home Member State control of bank 
supervision.7 Credit institutions established in one Member State 
may open branches in any other Member State without further 
authorization.s A credit institution is supervised by the authorities 
4 See Commission Recommendation 87/63 of 22 December 1986 Concerning the Introduc-
tion of Deposit-Guarantee Schemes in the Community, 1987 OJ (L 33) 16. 
5 Credit institution is defined as "an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or 
other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account." First Council 
Directive 77/780 of 12 December 1977 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Admin-
istrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, 
art. 1, ,1,1977 OJ (L 322) 30 [hereinafter First Banking DirectiveJ. The Proposed Directive 
refers only to credit institutions and their branches. [d. art. 2. 
6 For example, on October 3, 1989, Luxembourg introduced the Association pour la garantie 
des depots, Luxembourg "AGDL." Previous to this deposit protection scheme, Luxembourg 
had an unwritten agreement to fully guarantee banks. Also, in the United Kingdom, before 
the Statutory Deposit Protection Scheme came into effect on February 19, 1982, the Bank of 
England contained solvency and liquidity problems without any loss to depositors. In the early 
1970s at the end of a property boom, the Bank of England initiated "Operation Lifeboat." 
The purpose of the operation was to restore liquidity to secondary banks. Over £1.2 billion 
was lent to 26 companies that did not have enough liquid assets to cope with withdrawals. In 
the early 1980s, Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd. became insolvent. The Bank of England in 
consort with the major clearing banks, put together a rescue package to save that institution 
from bankruptcy. In all of the cases cited, none of the depositors with the troubled institutions 
lost any money. 
7 Second Council Directive 89/647 of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination of Laws, 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the 
Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780, 1989 OJ (L 386) 1 [herein-
after Second Banking Directive J. 
8Id. tit. v., art. 18. 
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and follows the laws of the Member State in which it is licensed and 
has its head office.9 The same Directive states, however, that super-
vision of the liquidity of the credit institutions' branches shall be the 
responsibility of the host Member State.10 Yet, a credit institution 
shall be wound up according to the law of the home Member State.ll 
The Proposed Directive requires the home Member State to insure 
that credit institutions participate in the deposit protection scheme 
in force in their territory which "shall cover the depositors of 
branches set up by such institutions in other Member States. "12 Thus, 
the responsibilities for supervising, winding-up, and guaranteeing 
deposits are spread among the Member States, making it essential 
that communications between Member States remain open and that 
Member State banking regulations be similar. 
Most of the deposit protection schemes available in the EC are 
similar in that they have limited guarantees.13 The limited guaran-
tees make certain exclusions and offer a fairly low level of protection 
to depositors. 14 The participating credit institutions that fund the 
deposit guarantee schemes argue that full guarantees would erode 
market discipline. The healthy credit institutions would be guaran-
teeing weak institutions which would be able to fund high risk 
investments with low cost funds. 
Of course, limited guarantees also result in a lower level of con-
9 '" [H]ome Member State' shall mean the Member State in which a credit institution has 
been authorized in accordance with Article 3 of Directive 77/780 IEEC," (i.e. the First Banking 
Directive). Second Banking Directive, supra note 7, tit. I, art. 1, 1 7. Title II of the First 
Banking Directive refers to "credit institutions having their head office in a Member State and 
their branches in other Member States." First Banking Directive, supra note 5, tit II. Article 
3 of Title II lists requirements for establishing a credit institution. ld. tit. II, art. 3. 
10 A "'host Member State' shall mean the Member State in which a credit institution has a 
branch or in which it provides services." Second Banking Directive, supra note 7, tit I, art. 1, 
1 8. Additionally, "'[h]ost Member States' shall retain responsibility ... for supervision of 
liquidity of branches of credit institutions pending further coordination." ld. tit. IV, art. 14, 
12. 
11 "[T]he business of the credit institution shall be wound up in accordance with the law 
of the home country in so far [sic] as this Directive ... doles] not provide otherwise." 
Amended Proposal 88/C36 for a Council Directive Concerning the Reorganization and the 
Winding-up of Credit Institutions and Deposit-Guarantee Schemes, tit III, art. 11,1 2, 1988 
OJ. (C 36) 1 [hereinafter Proposal for Winding-up]. 
12 Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 2,' l. 
13There are some exceptions. For example, certain deposits in Danish savings banks are 
fully guaranteed. See Lovtidende A., lov nr. 850 (16 Dec. 1987) § 3, , 2 [hereinafter Danish 
Law on Deposit Guarantee Fund]. 
14 See Proposed Directive, supra note 1, at Annex III. Portugal and Greece do not have 
deposit protection schemes in place-thus these countries are not listed on the chart. See id. 
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tribution from individual institutions. 15 Standing funds of individual 
protection schemes do not need to be highly capitalized. This is 
particularly true if there are either no failures of credit institutions 
or limited guarantees on failures. I6 
Eroded market discipline and weak credit institutions do not 
result from full guarantees on deposits. If market discipline and 
weak credit institutions are a concern, better supervision and higher 
capital requirements are needed, not limited guarantees. Adequate 
supervision requires that appropriate regulations be followed and 
competent authorities be provided with confidential information 
which will allow them to monitor the financial institutions. The 
Commission is developing guidelines for regulations by submitting 
proposals and recommendations on supervision of credit institu-
tions to the Council of the European Economic Community (Coun-
cil) P The Member States thus are aware of subjects before they 
become the topic of a Directive. As Member States implement Di-
rectives, appropriate regulations will be applied throughout the EC. 
An issue arises as to whether improved supervision of credit insti-
tutions should be incorporated into the Proposed Directive. The 
Second Banking Directive and two related Council DirectivesI8 al-
ready set out fundamental capital-based supervisory standards. An-
nual on-site examinations and independent audit reports also would 
improve supervision and encourage market discipline. 19 There is no 
Community-wide supervision or deposit insurance in the way that 
15 Some deposit protection schemes make this quite clear. For example, the United King-
dom Banking Act of 1979 states: 
[i]f it appears to the Board that payments in any financial year ... are likely to 
exhaust the Fund, ... the Board may ... levy special contributions from contribu-
tory institutions .... No contributory institution shall be requested to pay a further 
or special contribution if. .. the amount of that contribution, together with previous 
initial, further and special contributions made by the institution ... amounts to more 
than 0.3% of the institution's deposit base. 
Banking Act 1979, § 28(1),(3) (Eng.) [hereinafter 1979 U.K. Banking Act]. 
16 See Proposed Directive, supra note I, at Annex III for a list of how Member State deposit 
protection schemes are funded. 
17 See, e.g., Commission Recommendation 87/62 of 22 December 1986 on Monitoring and 
Controlling Large Exposures of Credit Institutions, 1987 OJ. (L 33) 10 [hereinafter Recom-
mendation on Exposures]. The Recommendation on Exposures proposes that credit institu-
tions provide data to competent authorities concerning exposures at least once a year and 
"more frequent reporting in line with normal prudential requirements." [d. 
18 Council Directive 89/299 of 17 April 1989 on the Own Funds of Credit Institutions, 1989 
OJ. (L 124) [hereinafter Own Funds Directive]; Council Directive 89/647 on Solvency Ratio 
for Credit Institutions 1989 OJ. (L 386) [hereinafter Solvency Ratio Directive]. 
19 See generally Modernizing the Financial System-Recommendations fur Safer, Mure Competi-
tive Banks [hereinafter U.S. Treasury Rep.]. 
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there is federal supervision and protection of credit institutions in 
the United States.20 The Second Banking Directive even allows Mem-
ber States individually to conclude cooperation agreements with 
third countries.2! One could argue that banking is an area which 
would be serviced better by an EC Treaty with third countries,22 
rather than each Member State negotiating its own treaty. 
In an effort to harmonize the deposit protection schemes in the 
EC, the Proposed Directive can be used as the lowest acceptable 
system.23 The ninth 'whereas clause' in the Proposed Directive states 
that "for economic reasons, it is undesirable to introduce through-
out the Community a very high level of protection which is liable 
to encourage the reckless management of institutions .... Contri-
butions to the funding of the scheme could become too burden-
some for the member institutions."24 The Member States are free to 
grant coverage above the EC minimum.25 Private deposit protection 
20 See generally Zavvos, Banking Integratirm and 1992: Legal Issues and Policy Implications, 31 
HARVARD INT'L L.J. 475 (1990). 
21 Second Banking Directive, supra note 7, art. 6, 11 3. 
22The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) provides a 
legal basis for the EC to negotiate treaties with third countries. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 113. Also, implied powers to negotiate 
treaties with third countries are found when the EC has issued Directives on the subject. See 
Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263,1111 15, 17. For example, the European 
Road Transport Agreement (ERTA) was an act suis generis not falling into any EEC Treaty 
category. See id. The European Court of Justice (ECJ), in a case relating to ERTA, stated: 
[t]o determine ... the Community's authority to enter into international agree-
ments, regard must be had to the whole scheme of the Treaty no less than to its 
substantive provisions .... In particular, each time the Community, with a view to 
implementing a common policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying 
down common rules, whatever form these may take, the Member States no longer 
have right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third 
countries which affect those rules. 
Id. The Community also may have implied powers to conclude international agreements. See 
Opinion 1/76, 1977 E.C.R. 741,11 4. The Commission asked the ECJ whether an EC agree-
ment with third countries establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels 
was compatible with the EEC Treaty. See id. The ECJ stated: 
Id. 
[T]he power to bind the Community vis-a.-vis third countries ... flows by implication 
from the provisions of the Treaty creating the internal power and insofar as the 
participation of the Community in the international agreement is, as here, necessary 
for the attainment of one of the objectives of the Community. 
23" ... it is indispensable to ensure a harmonized minimum level of deposit protection 
wherever in the Community deposits are located." Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 4, 
'I 1. The Proposed Directive recommends ECU 15,000 per depositor. Id.; see also id. at Annex 
III. 
24Id. art. 6, 'l[ 13. 
25Id. art. 4, 'I 3. 
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schemes, however, will not be eliminated. These arrangements, by 
their very nature, offer the least amount of protection to depositors. 
By imposing minimum requirements on the Member States, the 
Proposed Directive follows the path of least resistance. Such a Direc-
tive can be adopted without much objection. This type of framework 
Directive is becoming more popular than regulatory Directives. A 
framework Directive relies upon spontaneous harmonization to 
transpose Community policy into national laws. They also allow the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) more room to interpret EC law.26 
III. DEPOSIT PROTECTION SCHEMES 
A. United States of America 
The United States FDIC guarantees a general coverage of$lOO,OOO 
for each deposit. Over the past ten years so many banks, such as 
thrift savings and loans, have gone bankrupt or are going bankrupt 
in the United States, that the Bank Insurance Fund has been de-
pleted and needs to be recapitalized. In many cases, the United 
States Government covered the losses and compensated depositors. 
In December, 1991, Congress authorized the FDIC to draw on a $30 
billion appropriation to the Treasury Department. Changes must be 
made in the deposit protection scheme, and the U.S. Treasury, 
House Banking Committee, and Senate Banking Committee all are 
offering proposals. The law on deposit protection has not changed 
yet. Certain suggestions have been proposed such as reducing the 
scope of deposit protection. Thus, for example, pass-through insur-
26The EC] has been widening the scope of tbe EEC Treaty through its interpretation of 
Directives and the Treaty itself. The landmark case beginning tbis trend is Van Gend en Loos 
v. Nederlandse. 1963 E.C.R. 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 105. In tbat case, which is also tbe cornerstone of 
supremacy of EC law, tbe EC] found direct effect of EC Treaty law. See id. The Treaty article 
must be clear, precise, and unconditional in order to have direct effect. See id. An article 
which is directly effective needs no furtber implementing rules at tbe Member State level. [d. 
This decision was made in spite of tbe fact tbat half of tbe Member States in the Community 
objected to tbe decision. The objecting Member States were Germany, Belgium, and the 
Netberlands. The EC only had six Member States at tbat time. Article 189, paragraph 3 of the 
EEC Treaty states: "[aJ directive shall be binding as to the result to be achieved, upon each 
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to tbe national authorities the choice 
of form and methods." EEC TREATY art. 189, ~ 3. Thus, Directives should be transposed into 
the written rules of national law, providing legal certainty, in order to be binding. The EC], 
however, determined tbat when a Member State has not introduced implementing regulations 
before the expiration of tbe time limit provided for in tbe Directive, individuals may enforce 
the Directive as against the Member State. Becker v. Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt, 1982 
E.C.R. 53, 1 C.M.L.R. 499; Case 152/84, Marshall v. Soutbampton & South West Hampshire 
Area Healtb Authority (Teaching), 1986 E.C.R. 723, 748. 
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ance for pension plan deposits may be eliminated in the future. 27 
Also, depositors, rather than deposits, will be insured. Other recom-
mendations include increasing each bank's deposit insurance pre-
mium28 and improving capital supervision of credit institutions.29 
Even with increased premiums and capital supervision, however, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates another 719 banks 
will fail by 1995 at a cost of $40 billion.30 Advertising the amount of 
coverage, $100,000 per depositor, will continue. None of the studies 
recommend reducing the $100,000 amount of deposit protection. 
The suggested changes to the U.S. deposit protection scheme sum-
marized above indicate how a comprehensive protection scheme 
financed by taxpayers is being forced to change to one that requires 
better supervision and more contributions from banks,31 while offer-
ing less protection to depositors. 
B. Denmark 
The Danish Deposit Guarantee Fund32 (Danish Fund) is perhaps 
the most consumer- oriented of all schemes available in that it grants 
100 percent coverage for special types of deposits.33 These are depos-
its which are put into certain categories of savings accounts. Savings 
27 A pass-through account is a single deposit account in which a fiduciary such as an 
accountant, lawyer, or management group deposits funds on behalf of a large number of 
beneficiaries. Currently, the $100,000 deposit insurance passes through the fiduciary account 
to each of the beneficiaries. 
28 See American Bank; Funny for Some, ECONOMIST, Apr. 11, 1992, at 96. FDIC Chairman 
William Taylor announced on April 7, 1992 that an increase in premiums from 23 cents per 
$100 of insured deposits to 27-30 cents will be put off until 1993. [d. Also, starting in 1993, 
premiums will be risk-weighted. [d. Thus, well-capitalized banks could get a 10% discount on 
their premiums while weaker banks would be charged more. [d. 
29 See generally U.S. Treasury Rep., supra note 19. There are also legislative proposals from 
the Senate and House of Representatives and there has not been a finalized version published 
yet. [d. The only aspect of the current U.S. deposit which certainly will remain is the $100,000 
coverage. [d. This probably will change from $100,000 per deposit to $100,000 per depositor. 
[d. This is untouched because of fear of public reaction if the amount were lowered. [d. 
Eliminating the scope of protection is less evident to the public. [d. at 16, Part II. 
30 [d. 
31 United States banks function in the same way that EC credit institutions function. 
32Danish Law on Deposit Guarantee Fund, No. L42 (Dec. 10, 1987) [hereinafter Danish 
Fund]. When settling upon an appropriate deposit guarantee scheme, the Danish Banking 
Association and the Savings Bank Association were asked for suggestions. The Danish Minister 
of Industry, Mr. Nils Wil~elms, wanted an unlimited guarantee on all deposits. Finally, a 
compromise was worked out so that certain accounts now are covered in full. These include: 
capital pension accounts, personal pensions annuity accounts, pension installment accounts, 
child savings accounts, housing savings contracts, education savings accounts, deposits in the 
clients' accounts of lawyers, deposits administered by approved trust departments under the 
--------~ 
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accounts where a fiduciary relationship exists between the credit 
institution and beneficiary, such as trusts administered by the credit 
institution, pension accounts, child savings accounts, and education 
accounts, are insured 100 percent. Ordinary depositors are covered 
for deposits up to DKR 250,000 (U.S. $40,320). The scope of deposit 
protection is reduced by not covering managers, directors, and 
shareholders owning 10 percent or more of the credit institution. 
The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanstilsynet) re-
quires that a total of DKR two to three million be kept in the Danish 
Fund. The Danish Fund also is backed partially by the State, and the 
fund may take out a loan guaranteed by the State if its resources 
have been depleted, and claims of depositors cannot be covered. 
The Danish law also requires foreign branches of deposit-taking 
institutions in their territory to participate in the Danish Fund.34 
C. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom Deposit Protection Scheme (U.K Scheme) 
protects 75 percent of the first £20,000 (U.S. $36,000) deposit. 35 
Foreign currency accounts are not included in the U.K Scheme. A 
notice from H.M. Treasury Press Office states "protection has been 
limited to 75 percent in order that there should be incentive to 
prudence on the part of the depositor before deciding with which 
institution to place his funds. "36 Certain categories of deposits are 
not covered at all and are excluded from protection. These include, 
for example, secured deposits, deposits with a maturity of more than 
five years, certificates of deposit, and deposits from the director, 
controller, or manager of the institution or close relatives of such a 
person.37 All recognized banks and licensed institutions taking Ster-
ling deposits must contribute to the Deposit Protection Fund (stand-
Law on the Deposit in and Administration of Trust Funds, or under articles 61 and 65 of the 
Law on Administration of Estates, index-linked accounts, and deposits made under the Law 
on the Right of Debtors to Discharge Obligations by way of Deposits. 
33 The German protection schemes are equivalent to 100% protection on most deposits. 
The German system is more complicated in that there are separate protection schemes for 
cooperative banks, savings banks, and commercial banks. For example, depositors in commer-
cial banks are protected up to the equivalent of 30% of the individual bank's equity, which 
amounts to 100% protection for most savers. 
34 Danish Fund, supra note 32, art. 2, 'I 1. 
35 See 1979 U.K. Banking Act, supra note 15, amended Iry Banking Act 1987, Part II, 'I 60(1) 
(Eng.) [hereinafter 1987 U.K. Banking Act). 
36 Notes to Editors, Feb. 18, 1982, at 2, Press Office, H.M. Treasury, Parliament Street, London 
SWP 3AG. 
37 1987 U.K. Banking Act, supra note 35, § 52. 
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ing fund). Thus, branches of credit institutions with home offices in 
other countries also will contribute to the U.K. Scheme regardless 
of whether they are covered by a similar scheme in their home 
country.38 The standing fund should remain at a level between £5-6 
million39 (U.S. $9-10 million). If the standing fund is depleted and 
special contributions have been called already,40 the Bank of Eng-
land as lender oflast resort will lend money to the standing fundY 
Unused special contributions, however, will be returned pro rata to 
contributing institutions in the same financial year they are called. 
Contributions are tax deductible, but repayments to contributing 
institutions are taxable. 
D. Belgium 
The Belgian deposit guarantee scheme is a private agreement 
rather than a national law.42 It offers coverage of BF 500,000 (U.S. 
$14,700) for each deposit. The following is a description of the 
agreement. 
An "Intervention Fund" has been formed with yearly contribu-
tions from participating banks. The contributions are based upon 
the Belgian franc deposits, fixed deposits, and bonds of each par-
ticipant. 43 There is no lender of last resort, insurer, or emergency 
contribution scheme provided if the Intervention Fund is depleted. 
Rather, the agreement specifically denies reimbursement under any 
circumstances once the assets of the Intervention Fund are drawn 
down.44 What is disturbing about this agreement in particular, is that 
38 This was a change made by the Amendment to the U.K. Banking Act in 1987. 1987 U.K. 
Banking Act. supra note 35. 
39Id. § 54, 'l[ 1. Section 54 states that further contributions may be levied at the end of the 
Board's financial year if the Fund's resources have been reduced below Sterling three million, 
or, at any time, to give effect to an increase in the size of the Fund as a result of an order by 
the Treasury approved by both Houses of Parliament. Id. 
40 Special contributions may be required of participants to the deposit protection scheme 
in the event that the Fund is expected to exhaust its reserves by the end of the year. There 
is, however, an overall limit of 0.3% of an institution's deposit base which may be called. 1987 
UK Banking Act, supra note 35, §§ 54-56. 
41Id. § 64. Section 64 allows the Board to enter into arrangements to borrow funds in order 
to carry out its obligations. Id. 
42 Agreement Regarding the Bank Deposit Protection Scheme Between Institut de 
Reescompte et de Garantee and Association Belges des Banques (Jan. 1, 1985) [hereinafter 
Agreement Regarding Bank Deposit Protection]. 
43Id. 
44Id. 
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the Intervention Fund is not highly capitalized.45 In fact, the agree-
ment returns all contributions to participants after ten years.46 From 
this, one can conclude that private arrangements to provide deposit 
protection schemes need guiding principles that will encourage 
them to give adequate protection to depositors. 
In part, because it is the capital of the EC, many non-EC credit 
institutions established their head offices in Brussels, rather than a 
financial center such as London. For example, there are now twenty-
three Japanese banks with head offices in Brussels. Most of these 
banks have been set up in the past three years in anticipation of the 
single market and the easy access to other Member States.47 Thus, a 
large number of credit institutions have their home office in Bel-
gium. The Belgian Intervention Fund should reflect this by requir-
ing a higher minimum level of capitalization. 
IV. PROPOSED DIRECTIVE 
A. Home Country Versus Host Country Control 
The systems of the Member States outlined above illustrate the 
great differences in the scope and amount of deposit protection 
available in the EC.48 The Proposed Directive specifically aims at uni-
fying the banking deposit system within the EC. The sixth 'whereas 
clause' in the Proposed Directive uses the home country control 
provisions in the Second Banking Directive as a reason for changing 
deposit protection of branches to home country control. Article 2, 
45 [d. art. 27. Article 27 states: 
[tlhe Institute shall allocate a total amount of 200 million (Belgian) francs 
($6,000,000) to the intervention scheme. This amount shall be split between the 
banks' and the savings banks' funds proportionately to the volume of the Belgian 
franc deposits, fixed deposit receipts (bon de caisse), and bonds they hold on 30th 
September 1984. 
[d. art. 27. This means that there would be $3,000,000 to draw from in case of failure of a 
credit institution. This is the lowest amount that shall be held in the Intervention Fund. Thus, 
reimbursements to participating banks cannot draw down the fund below this amount. 
46 1987 V.K. Banking Act, supra note 35, art. 18. Article 18 states: " [clontributions that were 
not called by the Institute under Article 13, within 10 years period, are repaid to the (partici-
pating) bank." [d. art. 18. 
47 It is unclear how many of these banks are credit institutions. Some of the Japanese banks 
have home offices in Brussels because the clients they serve are there. For example, Mitsubishi 
Bank (Europe) SA., the fourth largest bank in Belgium, has a large client base in Brussels. 
The Nihonjinkaiasbl, Avenue Louis 279, Bte. 6, 1050 Brussels has a list of all Japanese banks 
and companies located in Belgium. 
48 Portugal and Greece, which are the only two Member States without guarantee schemes, 
are not mentioned. 
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paragraph 1 makes home country deposit protection of branches 
compulsory. 
Deposit protection is one area of banking which should be left 
under host country control. The main reason is that there is no 
centralized deposit protection system in the EC. In fact, the Maas-
tricht Treaty specifically forbids the European Central Bank to act 
as lender of last resort or to participate in insurance schemes.49 
Member State financial markets continue to be insulated and segre-
gated from each other. National Central Banks only are interested 
in acting as lender of last resort when there is a possibility of a 
collapse of their own national financial market. Since the financial 
markets in the EC are segregated still, a central bank in the home 
country may decide that the collapse of one credit institution and 
its branches is inconsequential to its national interest. The host 
country, in contrast, may see complete disruption of its financial 
market because of the collapse in its territory of the branch. 
In Belgium, a country with a low protection scheme and a very 
large number of credit institutions, the collapse of a credit institu-
tion with a branch in Denmark may be of little consequence to its 
own financial market. Since there are very few credit institutions in 
Denmark, however, the collapse of a major branch may have severe 
repercussions on its national financial market. Under host country 
deposit protection, the Danish financial market would feel less of a 
shock because the protection would be higher and a lender of last 
resort would be available. 
A consumer protection argument offers further support for host 
country control of deposit protection. Under home country control, 
twelve different protection schemes possibly could be available in 
one Member State. This confuses depositors. Advertising deposit 
protection schemes may reduce the confusion of the consumer. 
Even an especially prudent depositor would find it difficult to digest 
and understand twelve different deposit schemes. Article 2, para-
graph 2 does offer the possibility of coinsurance for deposits. 50 It is 
not likely, however, that branches will join the host country protec-
49 Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Dec. 11, 1991, tit. II, art. 4(a), 31 I.L.M. 247, 
258 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty1. Article 4(a) gives the EC authority to establish a European 
Central Bank. Maastricht Treaty, supra. The Protocol on the Statute of the European System 
of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, article 25 Prudential Supervision states: 
"[T1he European Central Bank may perform specific tasks concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception 
of insurance undertakings." Maastricht Treaty, Protocol on the Statute of the European System 
of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, Ch. V, art. 25, 31 I.L.M. at 338. 
50 Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 2,'2. 
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tion scheme if they already are contributing to the home country 
protection scheme. 
B. Non-EC Credit Institutions 
Article 3 does not require branches of non-EC credit institutions 
to participate in deposit-guarantee schemes in the EC.51 This is 
potentially dangerous as many countries do not extend protection 
of domestic institutions abroad.52 If the final Directive does not make 
participation of these branches compulsory, there is a possibility that 
they will not be covered by any deposit protection scheme. It is 
unlikely that institutions voluntarily will pay more to join a scheme 
that reduces profits and makes them less competitive.53 Article 3, 
paragraphs 2 and 3, however, require non-EC branches to inform 
depositors whether or not deposits are protected by a guarantee 
scheme.54 This should encourage the branches to participate in a 
deposit guarantee scheme. All credit institutions in the EC are re-
quired to provide depositors with information concerning their 
deposit guarantee scheme under article 6 of the Proposed Direc-
tive.55 This important provision will benefit consumers. 56 
C. Compensation 
Article 4 outlines the amount of compensation that should be 
allowed to depositors rather than deposits.57 The deposits are aggre-
gated and the total amount is protected up to ECU 15,000 per 
depositor (approximately U.S. $18,700) .58 Article 4 sets a minimum 
amount of compensation, but also allows Member States to offer a 
higher amount of protection.59 Most credit institutions would like to 
51Id. art 3. 
52 See id. at Annex IV for a chart that lists OECD countries that do not extend protection 
to deposits at branches abroad of domestic institutions. The basic information was extracted 
from R. M. PECCHIOLI, supra note 3. 
53 For example, the U.S. Treasury Report recommended that foreign deposits of U.S. credit 
institutions or banks neither be insured, nor subject to insurance premium assessments. See 
generally U.S. Treasury Rep., supra note 19. 
54 Proposed Directive, supra note I, art. 3, tt 2, 3. 
55Id. art 6. 
56The provisions requiring information concerning the deposit protection schemes was 
added to the final draft of the Proposed Directive by the Commission's Division of Consumer 
Policy Services. Id. 
57 The deposit scheme in the United States is also changing from protection for each deposit 
to protection for each depositor. 
58Id. art 4, § l. 
59 Id. art 4, t 3. 
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place a higher burden on depositors by requiring a mandatory 
ceiling on amounts Member States may protect. 50 As a matter of 
public policy, the more consumer oriented Member States would 
not take this suggested change seriously. 
Even minimum compensation amounts may not be realized, how-
ever, if the insurance fund is not capitalized adequately, extraordi-
nary calls cannot be made on participating banks, and no lender of 
last resort is available. Such requirements would avoid the hazards 
ofa system such as Belgium's, which does not pay any compensation 
to depositors once the Fund is drawn down completely. There are 
no requirements for such safeguards in the Proposed Directive. 
Article 4 also allows a Member State to limit the amount of com-
pensation to a percentage of deposits guaranteed.61 Although this is 
not a requirement, it accepts the V.K. model which limits compen-
sation to a percentage in order to provide an incentive for "pru-
dence on the part of the depositor."62 In fact, the V.K. came under 
heavy criticism for its use of percentages when BCCI failed in 1991. 
By the percentage method, small depositors carry the heaviest bur-
den if a credit institution fails. 
The scope of protection under the Proposed Directive does not 
include certain deposits which may be excluded and left unpro-
tected completely.63 The individual Member States may determine 
which, if any, of the listed deposits will be excluded. The only 
controversial exclusion is deposits of pension or retirement funds. 
Since the Member States are not required to adopt the exclusions, 
60 The EC Committee Financial Services Subcommittee of the American Chamber of Com-
merce in Belgium which is made up of European companies of American parentage, publish-
ed a position paper on coordination of deposit guarantee schemes on April 16, 1992. On page 
two the paper states the following: 
[t]he EC Committee believes that a mandatory maximum should also be set both in 
order to prevent excessive distortion of competition and as a way to maintain market 
discipline .... The possibility to limit compensation to a certain percentage of the 
deposit guaranteed should be supported as it introduces an element of market 
discipline. In fact, a system of declining percentages could be used as an alternative 
to a mandatory maximum amount. 
This report is on file with the author. 
6! Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 4, 1 4. 
62 The Proposed Directive raises the amount of compensation for British depositors to 90% 
of the total guaranteed deposits. See id. The United Kingdom and Ireland are the only 
Member States that have a system which limits compensation to a percentage of guaranteed 
deposits. Ireland uses a convoluted formula which starts compensation of deposits at the rate 
off our-fifths of deposits up to 5,000 Irish Pounds and ends at one-half of deposits over 10,000 
but less than 15,000 Irish Pounds. SeeThe Banking Act of 1989, Ch. 5, § 55 (1989) (Ir.). 
63 See Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 4, 1 2. 
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it should be of little concern to a country such as Denmark which 
grants 100 percent protection for pension funds. Danish pension 
fund managers should be put on notice not to make deposits in 
branches which do not participate in the Danish Fund. Member 
States which have excluded deposits not listed in article 4 as exclud-
able deposits, will need to amend their laws. For example, the 
United Kingdom excludes certificates of deposits and pass-through 
accounts. Since neither one of these categories of deposits is listed 
under excludable deposits, they should be protected. 
D. Advertising 
All previous drafts of the Proposed Directive included a n<radver-
tising requirement. In its review of the draft proposal, the Commis-
sion Consumer Policy Services division objected to the n<radvertis-
ing provision. Discussing an advertising provision is relevant since a 
n<radvertising provision possibly may be reinstated before the Pr<r 
posed Directive is enacted. 
Any no-advertising requirement in the Proposed Directive would 
run counter to the principles of the EC. The principles of the EC 
are stated in the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC Treaty). The EEC Treaty states in pertinent part, "[t]he 
Community shall have as its task, by establishing a Common Market 
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member 
States ... an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer 
relations between the States belonging to it. "64 Thus, by including 
the n<radvertising provision in the Proposed Directive, the Commis-
sion is going against the very foundation of the EC. 
Since each Member State deposit protection scheme must cover 
deposits placed in branches set up in other Member States,65 up to 
twelve credit institutions in one Member State may be participating 
in a different scheme. How can one expect prudence on the part 
of the depositor if the depositor does not know whether the credit 
institution insures accounts, and what percentage of deposits are 
protected in case of failure. If the informed public patronizes credit 
institutions which participate in a more favorable scheme, the public 
and domestic credit institutions themselves will exert pressure on 
the Member States to harmonize with or approximate the policies 
of neighboring Member States. This process is known as spontane-
64EEC ThEATY art. 2. 
65 Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 2, , 1. 
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ous harmonization. Spontaneous harmonization occurs when there 
is competition. Public knowledge is necessary for spontaneous har-
monization to occur. Such public knowledge is attained through 
advertising. 
If there is a prohibition on advertising, a Member State with a 
pro-consumer deposit protection scheme, such as Denmark, may 
object to the entry into their territory of branches of credit institu-
tions from other Member States with lower protection. The Member 
State might even refuse entry of such branches in the interest of the 
"general good." The concept of the "general good" appears three 
times in the Second Banking Directive.66 A Member State may re-
quire a branch of a credit institution to comply with its laws, in the 
"interest of the general good. "67 Again, once the branch begins to 
conduct business, the host Member State may prevent or punish it 
for acts contrary to rules adopted "in the interest of the general 
good."68 
The meaning of "in the interest of the general good" can be found 
in the case law of the ECl69 There are certain exceptions to the EEC 
Treaty policy of free movement of goods.70 These exceptions allow 
66 See Second Banking Directive, supra note 7, art. 19,14, art. 21",5,11. Article 21 states: 
[n]othing [in] this Article shall prevent credit institutions with head offices in other 
Member States from advertising their services through all available means of com-
munication in the host Member State, subject to any rules governing the form and 
the content of such advertising adopted in the interest of the general good. 
[d. art. 21, § 11. 
67 See id. art. 19, 1 4. Article 19 states: 
[d. 
[b]efore the branch of a credit institution commences its activities the competent 
authorities of the host Member State shall, within two months of receiving the 
information mentioned in paragraph 3, prepare for the supervision of the credit 
institution in accordance with Article 21 and if necessary indicate the conditions 
under which, in the interest of the general good, those activities must be carried on 
in the host Member State. 
68 [d. art. 21, 1 5. 
69 See W. Van Gerven, The Seccmd Banking Directive and the Case-Law of the Court of justice, 
10 Y.B. EUR. L. 57, 63-70 (1991). Advocate General of the Court of Justice, W. Van Gerven 
stated: "how must the phrase 'in the interest of the general good' be understood? In my view 
there is no possible doubt: this expression refers to the conditions recognized by the Court 
of Justice as justifYing national rules which constitute an obstacle to the free movement of 
goods or services." [d. at 65. 
70EEC TREATY art. 36. The four freedoms encompassed by the EEC Treaty are free move-
ment of goods, persons, services, and capital. See generally EEC TREATY. Non-tariff barriers to 
trade relating to goods are not permitted. Article 30 states: "Quantitative restrictions on 
imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the following 
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a Member State to enforce a national law which may impede free 
movement. The key to the exception is in the second sentence of 
article 36 of the EEC Treaty, which provides that there may not be 
"arbitrary discrimination" or "disguised restrictions on trade."71 Un-
der the discrimination analysis, the ECJ determines whether the 
national law in question is neutral as applied to domestic and for-
eign products.72 
The case law relating to free movement of persons and services is 
not as developed as that of the law relating to the free movement of 
goods.73 There is, however, some parallelism between the twO.74 By 
analogy, the competent authority of, for example, Denmark, may 
require branches of Member State credit institutions to advertise the 
extent of their deposit protection policy. The authority even may 
require that certain deposits be covered completely in the "interest 
of the general good. "75 The Danes could argue that this is a con-
provisions, be prohibited between the Member States." EEC TREATY art. 30. Article 36 provides 
non-economic exceptions to article 30. Article 36 provides: 
[tlhe provisions of articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions 
on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public 
policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or 
plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeologi-
cal value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions 
or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or 
a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. 
EEC TREATY art 36; see also EEC TREATY art. 100(a), 1: 4. 
71 EEC TREATY art. 36. 
72 See Case 158/86, Warner Brothers, Inc. v. Christiansen, 1988 OJ. (C 159) 4. This is a 
copyright case in which the ECJ agreed with a Danish law that stated that the right to rent 
out a video is not exhausted when a video is sold. See id. The Danish law states that there is 
a separate right of the proprietor to hire out a video. Since domestic and foreign videos are 
required to follow the Danish regulation, the Court did not find either disguised discrimina-
tion or a violation of article 30 of the EEC Treaty. [d. 
73 Articles 52 and 59 of the EEC Treaty provide for free movemen t of persons, establishment, 
and services. EEC TREATY arts. 52, 59. Article 48, paragraph 2 states: "such freedom of 
movement shall entail abolition of any discrimination based on nationality." EEC TREATY art. 
48. The direct effect of article 52 was confirmed by the EC] in Reyners v. Belgian State. See 
Case 2/74, 1974 E.C.R 631, 2 C.M.L.R. 305 (1974). The direct effect of article 59 was 
confirmed by the ECJ in Van Binsbergergen v. Bestuur van de BedrijJsvereniging vour de Metaal-
nijverheid. Case 33/74, 1974 E.C.R 1299. Free movement of capital became directly effective 
through Directive 88/361/EEC. 
74 See Case 262/81, Coditel SA v. Cine-Vog Films SA, 1982 E.C.R 3381, 1 C.M.L.R 49 (1983). 
In that case, the ECl suggested that article 36 of the EEC Treaty also applies to restrictions 
on the freedom to provide services. See id. at 3390-97. 
75 Second Banking Directive, supra note 7, art 21, § 11. As the national measure may not 
be disproportionate to the result desired, advertising may be the most suitable way of protect-
ing consumers. 
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sumer protection requirement. They could argue that the require-
ment does not discriminate arbitrarily against credit institutions 
from other Member States, since domestic credit institutions also 
must comply with it,76 
Consumer protection is an area which should be given priority in 
the Directives themselves. The EEC Treaty provides "the Commis-
sion, in its proposals ... concerning health, safety, environmental 
protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high level 
of protection. "77 The question is whether deposit protection schemes 
are meant to protect the depositor-consumer or to protect the credit 
institutions. 
E. National Implementing Laws 
The penultimate article in the Proposed Directive requires Mem-
ber States to "bring into force laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive .... "78 This article 
would be stronger if it stated that only government deposit protec-
tion schemes are acceptable under the Proposed Directive. In the 
interest of consumer protection, it is logical that the competent 
authorities of a Member State who are answerable to the people be 
responsible for developing a suitable deposit protection scheme. 
Professional organizations are not answerable to the people and 
cannot have the public interest in mind when developing a deposit 
76 Using the reasoning of the ECl presented in the landmark case Casis de Dijon, the Danes 
could argue for consumer protection on the same level as provided for in Denmark. See Case 
120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649 
[hereinafter Casis de Dijon). Casis de Dijon used the rule of reason which can be invoked in 
cases such as consumer protection or environmental protection where the exceptions of 
article 36 of the EEC Treaty do not strictly apply. See id. The rule of reason argues that when 
there are disparities or there is an absence of common rules and the rule in question does 
not discriminate against other Member States and are thus applied without distinction, then 
the rule is allowed. See id. The rule in question should result from mandatory requirements 
of general interest and the restriction should be necessary and not disproportionate with its 
objective. See id. 
77 EEC TREATY art. 100(a), 1 3. 
78Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 8. This is a change from Recommendation for 
Deposit-Guarantee Schemes. The fourth 'whereas clause' in that document states: 
Whereas a number of Member States have deposit-protection schemes which were 
set up on a voluntary basis under the responsibility of professional organizations, 
and which have proved just as suitable and effective as compulsory schemes set up 
and administered on a statutory basis; whereas it is therefore necessary to safeguard, 
in those Member States which do not yet have guarantee schemes, both private and 
governmental initiatives. 
On file with the author. 
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protection scheme. Their main interest must follow that of their 
members. In the case of credit institutions, the main interest should 
be profits. The fourteenth 'whereas clause' in the Proposed Direc-
tive addresses the issue of professional organization deposit protec-
tion schemes.79 The only problems the Proposed Directive finds with 
professional organizations relate to compulsory membership and 
exclusion from a deposit protection scheme.80 Exclusions from a 
protection scheme are possible only after certain steps are taken and 
the depositors are given a one-year notice.81 
Another problem with professional organizations which is not 
addressed by the Proposed Directive is the lack of safeguards needed 
to insure that there will be a means of providing the compensation 
of ECU 15,000 per depositor. These safeguards are adequate capi-
talization of the fund, ability to make extraordinary calls on partici-
pating banks, and a lender of last resort. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Council drafted the Proposed Directive as part 
of a series of measures aimed at unifying banking aspects of the 
internal market. Its stated goal is to increase the stability of the 
banking system and to protect depositors. This will be accomplished 
by providing a minimum level of protection, depositor information, 
and home country control. 
Advertising and information about the available deposit protec-
tion schemes are essential since depositors must share the financial 
burden of a failed credit institution. Depositors do not have the 
means of assessing or controlling the financial policies of credit 
institutions. They are expected to be prudent, however, when choos-
ing a credit institution. 
Home country control of deposit protection could be devastating 
for small financial markets accustomed to high levels of protection 
for depositors. The result is devastating because the financial mar-
79 See Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 2, it 1-2. 
80 These are also important and realistic issues. The issues address a problem which oc-
curred in Belgium. The professional organization in Belgium which administers the deposit 
protection scheme decided arbitrarily to exclude all deposits in a participating credit institu-
tion after the credit institution failed. The organization decided after the fact that no deposi-
tor should be reimbursed because there was a possibility that the credit institution was being 
used to funnel black money to Switzerland. Black money is money earned and not reported 
to the national tax authorities. Such a decision would not be allowed under the Proposed 
Directive. 
8l Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 2, t 3. 
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kets in the EC continue to be segregated. Furthermore, there is 
no community-wide deposit insurance. The Maastricht Treaty spe-
cifically rejects a proposal that the European Central Bank insure 
deposits or depositors in any way. 
If private deposit protection schemes are allowed, the final Direc-
tive should include some basic requirements to act as safeguards. 
These safeguards should include the following: a minimum amount 
available in a standing fund based upon the number of participating 
credit institutions; ability to make extraordinary calls on participat-
ing credit institutions in case of emergency; and availability of a 
lender of last resort. 
Some particularly vulnerable Member States may use the concept 
of the "general good" to force branches from other Member States 
to comply with stricter banking standards. When this occurs, those 
states most likely will seek an interpretation from the EC]. The final 
Directive on deposit protection certainly will begin the process of 
harmonizing deposit protection standards. With competition, the 
standards should not become minimal. 
